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Abstract
A puzzle in the literature on the formation of coalitions supporting International
Environmental Agreements (IEAs) is that if an IEA leads to substantial gains, then it will not
be supported by many countries. The non-cooperative game theoretic literature highlights the
“small coalitions” puzzle by which only a small number of countries are willing to sign an
environmental convention. In these models, a global coalition comprising all countries and
generating significant benefits is not sustainable. Moreover they indicate that greater the
number of countries in the coalition, higher the incentive of signatories to not respect their
engagement. The present paper resolves this puzzle by introducing social externalities, in
order to explain why some treaties can be sustained by nearly all countries, while others can
be supported only by a handful.
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When nations confront the global effects of environmental problems such as pollution 
emissions, they recognize that the welfare of a country depends not only on its own policy, 
but also on those of other countries. The formulation of environmental policy on an isolated 
national basis is therefore perceived to be inefficient. The recognition of “environment” as a 
global rather than a purely national issue has led to the signing of a number of “International 
Environmental Agreements” (or IEA) such as those to reduce ozone depletion, climate change 
and marine pollution.  
The first theoretical contributions characterized environmental games between nations 
as a “prisoner’s dilemma” leading them inevitably to be labelled as a “tragedy of the 
commons” problem. They implied that international agreements may not be effective as there 
were incentives for countries to “free-ride” given that the reduction of pollution emissions 
constituted a public good. However, IEAs continued to be signed. Over the past two decades, 
of the 194 members of the United Nations General Assembly, 184 have ratified the Montrel 
Protocol, 158 the Basel convention, 164 the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
species and 146 the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, the main IEAs are supported by a majority of 
nations. 
Presently, an extensive game-theoretic literature attempts to examine the strategic 
foundations of such international coalitions. Two main streams have emerged in this field 
since the last 15 years. The first argues that the formation of an IEA resembles the voluntary 
provision of a public good and formalizes the behaviour of countries as a cooperative game. It 
shows that an IEA ratified by all countries is stable (Chandler and Tulkens 1995). The second 
models IEAs as coalitions in a non-cooperative game (Heal 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 
1993; Barrett 1994; Péreau and Tazdaït 2001). A coalition is stable, when none of its 
members have an incentive to withdraw and when none of the non-members have an 
incentive to join the coalition (d’Aspremont et al. 1983). However, the predicted size of a 
stable IEA according to the second set of models is just between 2 to 4 countries, thereby 
contradicting reality. This result, which has been confirmed by a number of authors, is often 
referred to as the puzzle of “small coalitions”. 
A number of explanations have been put forward to resolve this puzzle. Lange and 
Vogt (2003) look at the implications of equity preferences for international cooperation in the 
reduction of some global pollutants. The existence of equity-interested countries increases the 
coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Along this vein, Hoel and Schneider (1997) 
propose a model similar to that of Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), but with one major 
difference: non-environmental costs are incurred by non-signatories. Naturally, if this 
additional cost is high enough, it may reverse the original incentives, thus inducing the 
country to stay in the coalition. Repeated interaction between countries (Barrett 1999) and the 
interests of “issue linkage” as between environmental investment and trade or technology 
cooperation (Cesar and De Zeeuw 1996), have also been proposed to justify large coalitions.  
The present article proposes yet another explanation: positive social externalities of a 
non-environmental nature that can be enjoyed if a country adheres to an IEA. In contrast to 
the “issue linkage” approach, there is no explicit negotiation linking adherence to a coalition 
to transfers on other issues1. Instead, all countries supporting an IEA benefit from a unilateral 
                                                 
1 In the literature on “issue linkage”, an IEA is explicitly linked to downstream tradeoffs on other specific issues 
such as trade policy, R&D, international debt and development assistance etc. once the coalition is formed so 
that the equilibrium is determined by the structure of tradeoffs between the different issues. In contrast, our paper 
does not consider any tradeoffs. A unilateral spillover is simply credited to all members of a coalition. 
 
  1positive externality in the form of a spillover. International treaties permit us to enter into a 
dialogue of exchange and cooperation, creating a means of articulating reciprocal exchanges 
on other issues (social or political) and yielding positive social externalities. This assumption 
is also widely accepted by sociologists, who propose that cooperation has as much a social as 
an economic function, serving to build “social capital” between the partners concerned 
(Granovetter 1985). For example, the preservation of the environment can serve to “test” 
political relations, becoming a means to demonstrate a willingness to breach diplomatic gaps. 
For instance, the ratification of the Kyoto protocol by Russia was clearly interpreted as a good 
will gesture towards Europe, which in turn made efforts to facilitate the entry of Russia into 
the Word Trade Organization. This plainly illustrates the notion of a “social externality” that 
goes beyond reciprocity. The ratification served to strengthen the position of Russia in the 
international arena at a time when the reforms being implemented by the Kremlin to reinforce 
the centralization of power were being highly criticized by the Western powers.   
 The introduction of a social externality can reverse an initial lack of incentives, 
inducing a country to become a signatory to an IEA. Consequently, larger coalitions, 
including the global coalition may be supported, while ensuring at the same time that total 
welfare increases with the number of signatories. 
 
2.  Model 
 
In this section, we start with the standard model presented in Barrett (1994), with 
constant marginal benefits and linear marginal costs and then we examine how the results 
change on introducing a positive social externality for signatories of an IEA. Consider a world 
with   identical countries, each of which emits a pollutant that damages a shared 
environmental resource. Each country can choose its abatement level  . Country i’s current 
abatement benefits, 
1,2..., i = N
i q
( ) i BQ depends not only on its own reduction efforts but also on those of 
other countries as shown below.  
1 ( ) .( ... ... ) ii n B Qqqq ω =+ + + + i iq = , where Q ∑ .    (1) 
The positive and constant marginal benefit of abatement is ω .  
However, each country’s abatement costs are assumed to depend only on its own 
abatement level. For country i, let the convex abatement cost function,   be given by:   ( ) i Cq
2 () . / 2 ii i Cq c q = .       ( 2 )  
The positive parameter c represents the slope of each country’s marginal abatement cost 
curve. 
  Now suppose that the countries play the following two-stage game. In the first stage, 
countries choose whether or not to participate in an IEA. Suppose k number of countries sign 
the IEA in the first stage. This can be observed and is common knowledge to all at the end of 
the first stage. In the second stage, the signatories of the IEA behave cooperatively by 
maximizing the coalition’s aggregate welfare and implementing a coalition abatement effort, 
. The non-signatories behave non-cooperatively by maximizing their individual welfare 
and applying the abatement effort,  .  In other words the non-signatories evoke the usual 
Cournot conjecture that every country chooses its abatement level taking as given the 




For simplicity, let the first k countries sign the IEA and the next k+1 to N countries 
remain as non-signatories. Signatories of an IEA benefit from a social externality that 
increases with the size of the coalition, with   being the social externality parameter.  0 s >
  2Each country i signing an IEA gets a payoff 
c
i π or 
c π . Every non-signatory country i gets a 
payoff of 
nc
i π  or 
nc π . These are defined below. 
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  Resolving by backward induction, we start with the second stage game and maximize 
()
c k π and  ()
nc k π  with respect to   and   respectively to get the equilibrium abatement 









= = .   (5) 
Then the first stage equilibrium or the number of countries which will sign the IEA is 




Definition An IEA consisting of   signatories is self-enforcing if and only if it is both 
internally and externally stable, i.e.: 
* k
( )
** * (1 ) ( ) 1
nc c nc c k k and k k ππ π π ( )
* − ≤≤ +    (6) 
 
Given the above definition we show in the following proposition that the size of an IEA 
coalition at equilibrium will depend on the relative values of the net benefit of the IEA (which 
is a function ω and c), and the social externality s.  
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Proof:  Substituting the values of the benefits and costs from equations (1)-(5) in equation 
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=  s . The solutions k  verifying inequality (7) lie within the interval  ; kk ⎡ ⎣⎤ ⎦  with: 
2 /2 2 1 2 /4 ks ss =+ − + +    and 
2 /2 2 1 2 /4 ks s s =+ + + +   . 
The solutions   satisfying inequality (8) lie in the interval  ' k ( ] ) ,' ' , kk ⎡ −∞∪ + ∞ ⎣  with  
2 '/ 2 1 1 2 / 4 ks s s k =+ − + + = −   1  and 
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Consequently all values of k  satisfying the condition   with 
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Figure1. Values of   that satisfy the criteria of self-enforcing IEA.  k
 
 
  At equilibrium, global benefits are an increasing function of the number of signatories. 
Let the total net benefits of an IEA with   members be given by 
=
* k
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The global abatement under an IEA then emerges as:  
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The above features clearly indicate the advantages of large coalitions; greater the 
number of signatories, higher the global benefits. Furthermore, the number of signatories at 
equilibrium,  , is positively correlated to   (recall proposition).  
* k s 
It can also be noted that the difference between the total benefits under full 
cooperation, with all countries being signatories and total non-cooperation is an increasing 
function of   as:     s 
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Therefore, the incentives to join an IEA, the size of an IEA at equilibrium and the 







=  s . In other words, higher 
the value of the non-environmental spillover s with respect to the pure environmental benefit 
of an IEA (which is a function of ω and c) greater the incentives to join an IEA.  
 
  43.  An illustration 
 
  We now present a series of simulations to prove that global coalitions are possible 
under certain parameter configurations. Table 1 gives the values of   and the equilibrium 



























* k =3 
s =.01 
* k =3 
s =.02 
* k =3 
s =.1 
* k =3 
s =.5 
* k =3 
s =1 
* k =4 
s =10 
* k =13 
 
.25 
s =0  
* k =3 
s =.05 
* k =3 
s =.25 
* k =3 
s =.5 
* k =4 
s =2.5 
* k =5 
s =5 
* k =8 
s =50 
* k =53 
 
.5 
s =0  
* k =3 
s =.1 
* k =3 
s =.5 
* k =3 
s =1 
* k =5 
s =5 
* k =8 
s =10 
* k =13 
s =100 
* k =100 
 
5 
s =0  
* k =3 
s =1 
* k =4 
s =5 
* k =8 
s =10 
* k =23 
s =50 
* k =53 
s =100 
* k =100 
s =1000 
* k =100 
 
25 
s =0  
* k =3 
s =5 
* k =8 
s =25 
* k =28 
s =50 
* k =100 
s =250 
* k =100 
s =500 
* k =100 
s =5000 
* k =100 
 
50 
s =0  
* k =3 
s =10 
* k =13 
s =50 
* k =53 
s =100 
* k =100 
s =500 
* k =100 
s =1000 
* k =100 
s =10000
* k =100 
 
100 
s =0  
* k =3 
s =20 
* k =23 
s =100 
* k =100 
s =200 
* k =100 
s =1000
* k =100 
s =2000 
* k =100 
s =20000
* k =100 
 
Table1: Number of signatories   and the value of   (for N=100). 
* k s 
 
Table 1 reveals that an IEA can be supported by a small or a large number of 







=  s , greater the number of signatories. Evidently,   is 
higher whenever the social externality s is greater. Furthermore, when the externality is zero, 
the standard result with   can be re-confirmed. Another interesting point of note is that 





; higher the costs of abatement or lower 
the benefits from abatement, greater the number of countries supporting the IEA. Finally, as 
long as the social externality s is positive, it is possible to verify that there exist values of   
and 
c
ω  that permit a global coalition with all countries being signatories. For example, for s = 
0.5, c = 0.01 and ω  = 0.01, we have a global coalition with all countries being signatories. 
The situation of full cooperation permits the augmentation of the abatement efforts while at 
the same time ensuring a maximum benefit for the signatories. This clearly contradicts the 
standard result enunciated in Barret (1994), according to which a global IEA coalition is not 





  54. Conclusion 
 
A problem that has been puzzling economists trying to model IEAs as a non-
cooperative game is that large coalition IEAs are never stable, unless the gains from 
cooperation are trivial. This is however, in contradiction with reality, where major 
environmental conventions are supported by a majority of countries and the gains are assumed 
to be non-trivial. By introducing a social externality as a spillover benefit of becoming a 
member of the IEA, this paper shows that the incentive structure of an IEA can be changed 
and even a global coalition can be ensured. In fact, greater the externality enjoyed by the 
signatories, greater the abatement efforts, and also greater the global benefits. Even if we 
suppose that all countries are homogenous in terms of benefits and abatement costs, our 
model provides a possible resolution of the “small coalitions puzzle”.   
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